Opinion
The blood on Buhari, Amaechi’s hands
Prior to the July 11, 2007, coordinated bombing of commuter trains in India’s largest city of Mumbai, Indians, like Nigerians, were wrapped in the shawls of their innocence and naivety. On that day, terrorists violently yanked the terror purity shawls off India’s face. In a matter of minutes, multiple explosive devices were detonated in a near-simultaneity. The devices instantly killed at least 183 people, with hundreds of others sustaining varying degrees of injuries. In a replay of this Mumbai attack in Nigeria last week, at least seven passengers were killed after gunmen attacked a busy train plying Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, and Kaduna. The terrorists were reported to have mined the track, ostensibly with IED explosives and subsequently forced the 840-capacity passenger train, with 362 validated passengers, to a halt. They then made a ring around the train’s coaches, opened fire on the defenceless passengers and abducted an unknown number of them from the train.
As worthwhile as a means of transportation as they are, train services in Africa came with resistance and revolt. While some African rulers like Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia and Abbas I of Egypt favoured its establishment, so many others disapproved of it, basing their resentment on the landscape of power and trade that it would tilt in favour of the colonialists. Major opposition to it was mounted by the Damal of Cayor, Late Dior Diop of Senegal. While voicing his rejection to French governor, Servatius, he had said: “As long as I live, be assured, I shall oppose, with all my might, the construction of this railway”. This notwithstanding, Africa’s network of railways got started in 1852, in Alexandria, Egypt.
The eyes of terrorists first opened to the mass murder weapon that trains constitute when, on September 13, 1931, a bomber, Szilveszter Matuska, derailed the Vienna Express train by planting a bomb that killed 22 and wounded 120 others. Since then, terrorists have targeted train services’ full infrastructure like ticket halls, railway bridges, trains, passenger stations, train depots, signalling and tracks. Indeed, urban commuter rail networks and subways, otherwise known as mass rapid transit rail systems, have been the soft target of the majority of terrorist attacks. These have led to approximately 1,000 being killed, with over 5,000 injuries, as well as economic losses of billions of dollars. The March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings held to be one of the most sophisticated terrorist attacks on a rail target which killed 191 people, for instance, there was a simultaneous detonation of 10 devices comprising Goma-2 Eco plastic explosive detonated by a mobile phone.
Like a water-dripping sore that naturally attracts a horde of flies, commuter trains have never been the same again after the 1931 Matuska attack. They have since been a special delicacy with which terrorists enjoy sumptuous a la carte meals of their victims’ flowing blood and mangled flesh. This is because train attacks come with a high fatality, mass disruption, huge national alarm, paralysis of the transport network and the national physiological and psychological trauma that goes with it. This is not to talk of the economic loss and long-term dislocation the people face in its aftermath.
The attacks are coordinated by terrorist groups with various attack methods. The list is endless, ranging from Al-Qaeda and its ancillary groups, Algerian and Chechen militants, Kashmiri separatists, South America’s left-wing guerrillas and Irish republican terrorists. London Underground and British Railways were said to have attracted more than 6,500 bomb threats between 1991 and 1997. On August 23, 1973, for instance, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) had targeted the mainland UK rail system by defusing a bomb at Central London’s Baker Street Underground station. Terrorists’ major modus operandi, tactical spectrum and operational template contain the detonation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Asked why he caused so much pain to his victims, Matuska had told his interrogators that he derived sexual pleasure from watching trains crash. Since then, the global statistics of train attacks have mounted unconscionably like Nigeria’s national debt. Eight years after, on August 28, 1939, during the Nazi World War 11 German invasion of Poland, a German agent, Antoni Guzy, also placed a suitcase bomb at a busy railway station which killed 20 and wounded 35. According to the database of Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, between the period 1998 and July 2006, at least 74 separate terrorist attacks were unleashed on heavy rail, metro subway systems and light rail systems in the whole world, as well as on trains and other rail infrastructure.
Since that last week’s attack, Nigerians have been wrapped up in the shroud of sadness. Newspaper features focusing on the victims made matters worse, evoking grim and tears in the people. Sijuade Oyetoso, TUC chairman, said to have been shot in the head inside the train, as well as Dr Chinelo Megafu, the young medical doctor graduate of the University of Port Harcourt evoke sessions of tears. Just a few days before this attack, heavily armed terrorists had attacked the Kaduna airport, and by the time they finished the operation, a security guard was shot dead. This led to flights cancellations.
Only yesterday, a news report said that no fewer than 1,545 persons had been killed by terrorists in the first quarter of 2022. Quoting a joint report by the Community of Practice Against Mass Atrocities and the Joint Action Civil Society Committee, under the aegis of Nigeria Mourns, the report also said that at least 1,321 persons were abducted by these terrorists between January 1 and March 30, 2022, with Nigeria’s north-western states of Kaduna, Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi and the north-central state of Niger, coming under intense shelling by these cadaver-loving terrorists. While kidnapping for ransom has become commonplace across Nigeria, this selfsame Abuja-Kaduna highway has acquired the notoriety of one of the most dangerous roads in Nigeria. Kidnappers string around it like ants make a ring around the pee of a diabetic, ambushing vehicles at several points on the expressway corridors, killing many and constituting selves to lords of the Manor on the road.
With the above unflattering statistics, it will appear that, by still being shocked by attacks from terrorists, Nigerians, like the proverbial ostrich, are in the first stage of the psychological state of denial of the reality that their country is a terror corridor. In the architecture of terrorism, mass commuter rail transport is one of the most vulnerable weapons of terrorists and terrorist attacks. Indeed, global graphs of terror attacks since Matuska’s have shown clearly that Islamist militant groups have a notorious interest in specifically targeting rail transport because of the mass casualties that often come from such attacks. The question to then ask is, were the minister of transportation, Rotimi Amaechi, the national security adviser, Babagana Monguno, their commander in chief, Muhammadu Buhari, and the coterie of so-called securocrats who surround the seat of power, so naïve about the pleasure that terrorists derive from attacking trains, so much that they didn’t know of this elementary fact?
Whether out of ignorance, the usual lackadaisical attitude of Nigerian leaders or their oft quest to always put financial interest ahead of the people’s welfare, when the train attack is reduced to its brass tacks, it will be difficult not to ascribe the deaths of these innocent Nigerians to a deliberate wastage of citizens’ lives that is the familiar penchant of her leaders. The logic is that since it is no longer news that Nigeria has become a notorious terrorism corridor, how does one explain why the government had to be picking its tooth while train commuters plied the Abuja-Kaduna notorious route, or any other train route in Nigeria, without adequate security? Apart from the fact that Kaduna state has become one of the most dangerous places to live in Nigeria, it is a known fact that the Abuja-Kaduna highway is one of the most dangerous roads in the country. It is full of a swarm of kidnappers who are known to ambush vehicles at several points on the expressway. Taken all together, one can then safely say that the blood of these innocent citizens, shed violently midstream, bears the government’s vicarious hands.
With the subsequent leakage of a memo said to have been presented by Amaechi to the federal executive council (FEC) but which was rightly rejected, it becomes a necessary conclusion to say that this wastage of the people’s lives in that train attack must have been due to one of three probable reasons, or even all: Sabotage by those hungry to prove a point, the government’s deliberately naive trivializing of the destructive powers of terrorists and third, the cruelty of government’s act of placing the cart before the horse. By preferencing the publicity stunts inherent in rushing first to shore up the sagging government’s public credential through the launching of the train “revolution” in 2016, rather than putting in place a simultaneous installation of security gadgets for the protection and safeguard of people’s lives, the Nigerian government can logically be said to have the blood of the people dripping from its hands.
Amaechi was said to have presented the wishy-washy memo to the FEC presided over by Vice President Yemi Osinbajo on September 24, 2021. In it, he had requested FEC approval of N3.7 billion for a contract on surveillance systems along the Abuja-Kaduna rail track. In presenting the proposal, Amaechi, the two-term governor of Rivers state and a seven-year minister, had recommended a firm, Mogjan Nigeria Limited, with very manifest incapability and nil track record of previous handling of such contract, as his preference. The company, incorporated on August 6, 2019, less than three years ago and with a turnover of N84.9 million, was Amaechi’s best for the execution of such a humongous job. To worsen matters, this leaked memo was said to have revealed so many more incongruities which, were it to be in a saner clime, Amaechi should have been fired for gross misconduct and laxity. Upon the attack, however, while fielding questions from journalists, Amaechi had claimed that he predicted the imminence of the attack and, ostensibly gloatingly, condemned the rejection of his memo presented before the FEC.
A few questions arise from this macabre atilogwu dance that Amaechi and the federal government are making on the graves of Nigerian dead. The rail services “revolution” was commissioned in July 2016 by President Buhari and this same Abuja-Kaduna train was the anchor. Speaking at the train’s main station at Idu, Abuja, Buhari promised that government would link all states and commercial centres of Nigeria with the rail lines. He later took a ceremonial train ride from Idu to Kubwa. This was at a time when terrorists’ bayonets were penetrating the nooks and crannies of Nigeria.
If Minister Amaechi was then presenting a memo for the procurement of security gadgets on that corridor in 2021, five years after the train services commissioning, it will mean one of three things; that Amaechi was totally naïve about the destructive powers of terrorists, that he was unapologetically simplistic about it or was grossly unmindful of the need to provide ancillary security of the rail systems to go simultaneously with its commissioning. Or could it be that he just didn’t care? By presenting such an embarrassingly empty doggerel as a memo to the highest decision-making body in Nigeria, it seems to point to the fact that such a regime of laxity, rigourlessness and, I dare say, fakery must have marked previous presentations to FEC which their sponsors got away with and which strengthened him to present a similarly vacuous memo. The memo may just be pointing at a pedigree of maggot infestations in procurements and contracts at the highest level of governance in Nigeria.
It will appear that the Nigerian government and its so-called securocrats are only excellent when it comes to filching budgets of security. For a Nigerian military that went to field operations across the world, garnering laurels and badges of honour for its performance, the only explanation for this feigning of counter-insurgency inability by the Nigerian military must be the gross national larceny sense that has infiltrated the high command of the Nigerian security. Like Eddy Iroh said in his ‘Toads of War’, Nigerian military generals have grown rotund bellies and cheeks like toads out of this terrorism calamity in Nigeria. It is why there is mutual suspicion, jealousy and efforts at cross-purposes across the forces.
Otherwise, in the rest of the world where terrorist attacks occurred, military generals, working with the entire national security architecture, took time to study the psychology of the attacks, with a view to countering them. Russia, Germany, Pakistan, Angola, South Korea, Colombia, Japan, UK, France, Spain, Italy, India, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, among others, have witnessed a worse form of terror on their railway networks than Nigeria did. Immediately after terrorists attacked the World Trade Center on September 11 2001, the New York subway became a recipient of its disruption as almost a quarter of a mile of its tunnel got filled with debris from the bombed twin towers, in addition to structural damage to three stations. After these attacks, counter-insurgency experts went into spirited work to prevent further attacks. One, they found out that, aside from the mass murder that trains pose to terrorists, the long-term economic loss, as well as massive scare on the collective national and corporate psyche, are the garlands that terrorists are obsessed with, which make train attacks their most desirable option. The 2004 Madrid rail bombings, as well as the 2005 attacks on London’s transport network, are good examples here.
In Nigeria, however, knowing the ancient predilection of our leaders for being lax and greedy, train attacks like the one of last week are likely to intensify. Terrorists are far more committed to their craft than those paid to keep watch on the people. Security experts know that bombers don’t just strike without doing reconnaissance and survey of targets. In the Abuja-Kaduna train attack, some of the terrorists were said to have been on board. Did our security know this?
With the soft target that bombing and attacking trains pose in terrorism corridors worldwide, chief of which Nigeria is, it will be gross criminal laxity or inexplicable compromise for the Buhari government not to have anticipated the Abuja-Kaduna train attack. By seeking to install that security equipment in 2021, it showed that Amaechi had an awareness of the threat terrorists posed. So what has happened between then and now? Did he fold his arms? Those who claim that there is a dalliance between top government officials and terrorists may have had corroboration material in this train attack. It reminds me of Willo Davis Roberts’ Blood on His Hands, the story of 16-year-old Marc and his bloody travails and confrontations. One thing that is not in doubt is that the blood of the murdered is crying for vengeance from the Buhari government.
Dr. Festus Adedayo, a lawyer, journalist and columnist writes
The most foolish person in a burning house is not the one who cannot find the exit. It is the one who knew the house would burn, watched it happen, and only ran when the ceiling collapsed. That is Nigeria’s governance posture toward insecurity—a pattern so consistent that it has become normalized.
“Ikú tó pa ojúgbà ẹni, òwe ló fi pa. (The death that kills your neighbour is a proverb directed at you).
The bandits did not simply arrive. They sent warnings ahead of them through a trail of violence that crossed state lines and appeared in every massacre headline we filed away as someone else’s problem.
When Insecurity Was Still “Someone Else’s Problem”
When the North was burning and the Middle Belt bleeding, the South West treated it as distant noise. Kwara became the first warning sign—the bridge between North and South—slowly slipping under the shadow of insurgency. The question every serious observer should have asked was simple: what happens when it crosses the border?
South West governors issued statements—careful, brief, and reactive. None moved with the urgency the threat demanded. Before long, violence arrived at our doorstep: herder brutality in Oke-Ogun, attacks in Oyo and Ekiti, kidnappings along the Ibadan–Ijebu-Ode expressway, and forest camps emerging in Ondo.
The warning signs had matured into reality, yet we were still searching for an exit strategy that should have been built years earlier.
The Problem: We Only Count the Dead
In safety performance management, there is a critical distinction between lagging indicators—outcomes after failure (deaths, destruction, losses)—and leading indicators, which measure prevention before failure occurs.
Aviation, oil and gas, and other high-risk industries understand this clearly: a system that obsesses over lagging indicators will always arrive after the accident.
Nigeria’s security governance is built almost entirely on lagging indicators. We count attacks after they happen. We rebuild after a collapse. We mourn after preventable deaths.
We rarely ask:
How many attacks were prevented this quarter?
How many threats were neutralized before execution?
How many cells were dismantled at the planning stage?
We do not know the answers—because we are not measuring them. The system was never designed to prevent. It was designed to respond: loudly, visibly, expensively, and always too late.
Another Base. The Same Question Nobody Asks
The presidency is reportedly considering a military base in Oriire Local Government Area of Oyo state. It is a familiar pattern: a major security incident, public outrage, and an institutional response designed to signal seriousness.
But the critical question remains unanswered: what has been the leading-indicator performance of existing bases?
How have long-standing military formations in places like Jos, Benue, and Zamfara—some active for over two decades—actually shifted the security outcome?
A military base without actionable intelligence is a stationary slaughter ground for soldiers. It does not prevent attacks; it often becomes a reactive outpost in a repeating cycle: attack, deployment, statement, investigation, and then silence—while underlying threat networks remain intact.
The Incentive Structure Behind the Chaos
The deeper issue is not the capability of security forces. It is the incentive structure of the system.
When leadership is judged only by incidents that have already occurred, governance shifts from prevention to performance management of failure. The objective becomes managing optics, not reducing probability.
Nigeria’s security budget has grown significantly over the past decade, yet insecurity has worsened. Kidnappings have become more brazen. Why? Because funding is justified by the persistence of the crisis, not its resolution.
If the problem is solved, what justifies the next budget cycle?
For years, decentralization has been proposed as the structural reform that could change the system—but it remains trapped in political rhetoric. Why? Because decentralization disperses power, and power in Nigeria’s political economy is not dispersed. It is concentrated.
Sixteen Days. Full Stop.
Forty-six children and teachers were kidnapped in Oriire. It reportedly took sixteen days for the presidency to authorize a specialized rescue framework.
Sixteen days before the Commander-in-Chief treated the abduction of forty-six human beings as a crisis requiring formal executive activation.
But responsibility in moments like this is not singular.
The Oyo State Governor, by constitutional convention regarded as the Chief Security Officer of the state and a recipient of security votes, also occupies a central coordinating role in the security architecture of the state. Within a crisis of this scale, expectations of rapid intergovernmental coordination, visible command urgency, and sustained pressure on federal response mechanisms are not optional, hey are inherent to the office.
Yet, the response cycle, from abduction to high-level coordinated action and physical engagement with affected communities, unfolded at a pace that raised legitimate public concern about the speed and intensity of institutional reaction.
By the time visible field visits and coordinated engagements occurred, the delay had already become part of the public record of the crisis itself—shaping perception as much as the incident shaped fear on the ground.
In a functional security system, crisis response is measured in hours, not days. Not for symbolism, but because time directly affects outcomes: every passing hour in an active kidnapping reduces the probability of safe recovery and increases the leverage of perpetrators.
Sixteen days, therefore, is not merely a lapse in timing. It reflects a deeper structural problem—where urgency is often declared after pressure builds, rather than operationalized when intelligence first breaks.
And in that gap between incident and action, citizens are left to absorb the consequences of delayed coordination across all tiers of authority.
The Verdict
Nigeria does not primarily need more military bases. It needs a new security measurement architecture—one that prioritizes intelligence conversion rates, early-warning response times, and pre-emptive disruption metrics over post-incident operations.
Every threat must be treated as time-sensitive, where minutes and hours determine outcomes—not weeks and statements.
Most importantly, citizens must shift the accountability question:
Not only “why did the attack happen?”
But “why was it not prevented?”
Nigeria’s security challenge is ultimately a leadership and systems failure—an institutional preference for reaction over prevention, because prevention is politically invisible.
You cannot hold a press conference about the attack that never happened.
Until this reality is named and confronted with precision, the cycle will continue.
Growing support has continued to trail a youthful politician and technology advocate, Hon. Khalil Mustapha Adegboyega, popularly known as Repete, as many youths in Ibadan North Federal Constituency expressed confidence in his leadership style and vision for development.
Across several communities within the constituency, residents, particularly students, artisans and young professionals, described Repete as one of the emerging political figures with strong grassroots appeal and a passion for youth empowerment.
Supporters said his growing popularity stems from his consistent advocacy for innovation, entrepreneurship and skills development aimed at addressing unemployment and creating opportunities for young people.
As an engineer and technology enthusiast, Repete is also said to possess a deep understanding of the evolving digital economy and the need to position youths for global competitiveness.
Many of his supporters noted that his approach to leadership focuses on practical solutions, mentorship and capacity-building initiatives capable of helping young people become self-reliant and economically productive.
Some community stakeholders who spoke on his rising profile said his humility, accessibility and relationship with the grassroots have continued to endear him to many residents within the constituency.
They added that Repete’s engagement with youths and community groups reflects his commitment to inclusive governance and people-oriented representation.
Observers within the constituency also maintained that the increasing support for the politician reflects a growing desire among residents for a new generation of leaders driven by innovation, competence and accountability.
According to them, many young people see Repete as a symbol of hope and progressive leadership capable of contributing meaningfully to the development of Ibadan North Federal Constituency.
The All Progressives Congress (APC) in Oyo State stands on the edge of a consequential decision—one that may define not only its fortunes in Ibadan North Federal Constituency but also its broader political relevance in the state.
As the countdown to the party primaries intensifies, the question before APC leaders is no longer routine. It is strategic. It is urgent. And it is decisive: will the party align with the clear preference of the people or risk repeating costly political miscalculations?
At the centre of this debate is Hon. Khalil Mustapha Adegboyega, widely known as Repete—a name that has, over time, evolved from a political identity into a grassroots phenomenon.
A Candidate Rooted in the People
In contemporary Nigerian politics, where voter awareness is rising and expectations are shifting, candidates are increasingly judged not by promises but by presence. On this scale, Adegboyega stands tall.
His political journey is marked by consistent engagement with constituents—far beyond the optics of election seasons. From youth empowerment initiatives that provide practical skills and startup support, to sustained interventions in healthcare access for the elderly and indigent, his footprint across Ibadan North reflects a model of leadership anchored on service.
Unlike the transactional approach that often defines political relationships, Adegboyega’s connection with the people appears organic—built on trust, accessibility, and continuity. These are not mere campaign attributes; they are political assets.
The Danger of Political Disconnect
History offers the APC a clear lesson: parties that ignore grassroots sentiment often pay a heavy electoral price. The imposition of candidates perceived as distant or untested has, in several instances, resulted in voter apathy, internal dissent, and eventual defeat at the polls.
Ibadan North presents no exception.
With opposition parties closely monitoring the APC’s internal dynamics, any misstep in candidate selection could provide a ready opening. A divided house, coupled with a candidate lacking widespread acceptance, is a formula the opposition is well-positioned to exploit.
The implication is straightforward: this is not merely about party loyalty; it is about electoral viability.
Echoes from the Grassroots
Across the length and breadth of Ibadan North—markets, motor parks, religious centres, and community gatherings—a consistent pattern emerges in political conversations. The name “Repete” resonates with familiarity and acceptance.
Such organic support is not easily manufactured. It is cultivated over time through visible impact and sustained presence. For a party seeking electoral certainty in a competitive environment, this level of grassroots validation is not just desirable—it is critical.
A Test of Leadership and Judgment
For the APC leadership in Oyo State, the moment calls for clarity of purpose. Decisions driven by narrow interests, personal alignments, or short-term calculations may carry long-term consequences.
The task, therefore, is to balance internal considerations with external realities. Elections are ultimately decided by voters, not by party caucuses. A candidate who commands public confidence offers the strongest pathway to victory.
The Stakes Are Clear
Ibadan North is too strategic a constituency for experimentation. The cost of error is not limited to a single seat; it extends to party cohesion, credibility, and future positioning within the state’s political landscape.
In this context, the argument for Adegboyega is less about sentiment and more about strategy. His visibility, acceptability, and record of engagement place him in a strong position to consolidate support and mobilise voters effectively.
Conclusion: A Choice with Consequences
As the APC moves closer to its primaries, the decision before it is both simple and significant: align with a candidate who reflects the mood of the electorate or risk conceding advantage to a watchful opposition.
In politics, moments such as this often separate foresight from hindsight.
For APC in Ibadan North, this may well be one of those defining moments.
Aderibigbe Akanbi, a political analyst, writes from Ibadan.
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